Web Application Penetration Testing Services

An unauthenticated scan sees the login page and little else. The interesting bugs live behind the login. We test with real credentials for each role you have: a normal user, an admin, a read-only account, whatever your permission model contains. Then we try to cross those boundaries. Can a standard user reach an admin endpoint by changing an ID in the URL? Can they set their own role in a profile-update request the front end never exposes? These are the findings that turn into breaches.

Modern applications lean on third parties: a payment gateway, an identity provider, an S3 bucket, a webhook that trusts whatever it receives. These seams are where responsibility gets fuzzy and where attackers look first. We map every integration your app talks to and test the trust it places in each one.

We start by understanding the application as a system: its endpoints, parameters, roles, technologies and data flows. Using Burp Suite as the working proxy, plus tools like ffuf for content discovery, we build a complete picture of the attack surface before touching a single payload. Hidden APIs and forgotten admin panels usually surface here.

With the map in hand, the real work begins. We work through each vulnerability class against each function, chaining small issues into bigger ones. A verbose error message plus a predictable ID plus a missing access check is three low findings that together read another tenant’s data. We prove the impact by exploiting it in a controlled way, capturing exactly what an attacker would see, and we stop short of anything that would damage your data.

Why we chain findings

Attackers do not respect the severity labels on individual bugs. They combine whatever gets them further. Reporting each issue in isolation understates real risk, so we show you the chain: how an unauthenticated visitor reaches a low-privilege account, then an admin, then your customer records.

You get an executive summary written for leadership and a technical report your developers can work from directly. Every finding carries a CVSS score, a clear impact statement, step-by-step reproduction, and a specific fix, not “apply best practice”. After you remediate, the retest is included at no extra cost so you can prove the holes are closed.

The single most common serious finding. An object reference like /invoice/1042 that returns invoice 1043 when you ask for it. A hidden field that sets your account type. We test every authenticated action against every role, because this is where the worst breaches start and where automated tools are weakest.

SQL injection is less common than it was but far from dead, especially in older reporting and search features. Server-side request forgery has taken its place as the flaw that reaches into your internal network and cloud metadata. Both get tested with real payloads, not signature matching.

No scanner understands your discount rules or your order lifecycle. A human does. We look for the ways a determined user bends your workflow to their advantage: applying a coupon after checkout, changing a price in a request, replaying a one-time action, skipping a verification step.

Tokens that never expire, reset links that work twice, MFA that can be skipped by hitting the post-login endpoint directly. Small on paper, account takeover in practice.

PCI DSS 4.0 requirement 11.4 calls for regular application-layer penetration testing, and our reporting is written to satisfy it. For ISO 27001 the results support control A.8.29 (secure testing) and your risk-treatment evidence; for SOC 2 they feed the security criteria your auditor examines.

Where personal data is in scope, we treat testing as part of demonstrating the technical measures GDPR expects. Financial-sector clients across Europe use these engagements as part of DORA’s threat-led testing and resilience requirements.

New authentication, a new payment provider, a move to a different framework or a lift into the cloud all reshape the attack surface. Testing after the change but before the public launch catches the new mistakes while they are still cheap to fix.

Applications drift. Features accumulate, dependencies age, and yesterday’s safe assumption becomes today’s hole. Annual testing is the floor for most compliance frameworks; teams shipping continuously often test twice a year or scope a lighter test around each significant release.

If something got in, or nearly did, you want to know whether the same class of weakness exists elsewhere. A full test after an incident answers the question your board will ask: is this fixed everywhere, or only where we noticed?