Threat Modeling Services

STRIDE walks each element of the system through six threat categories: spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, and elevation of privilege. It is thorough and structured, which makes it a strong default for a component you can draw as a data-flow diagram. We apply it per boundary so nothing gets skipped because it felt safe.

The Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis is risk-centric and ties the technical picture back to business impact. It suits organizations that need the model to speak to leadership and to compliance, because it starts from business objectives and ends at prioritized, testable threats.

For a specific high-value asset, an attack tree lays out every path to compromise it, branch by branch, until each leaf is a concrete action. Where you need to compare threats numerically, we use a DREAD-style scoring so the ranking is transparent rather than a gut call, and we are open about the fact that any scoring model is a conversation aid, not a physics equation.

User stories describe what a legitimate user wants. Abuse cases describe what an attacker wants, and they surface requirements a feature spec never mentions: rate limiting on a password reset, ownership checks on an object reference, an audit trail on a privileged action. We write these alongside your product team so security requirements enter the backlog rather than arriving as a surprise in a pentest report.

We agree what is in scope, gather the architecture, and decompose the system into components, data stores, processes and the flows between them. Out of this comes a data-flow diagram with trust boundaries marked, which is the map the rest of the engagement works from.

Working through the diagram with your team, we enumerate threats at each boundary and each element using the chosen method. This is where the attacker’s perspective earns its keep: an engineer who built the system sees the intended path, and we look for the ones that were never intended.

Every threat gets a likelihood and impact, a rank, and a check against the controls you already have. Some threats are already covered; saying so plainly is as useful as finding a gap, because it stops the team spending effort where it is not needed. Where a threat maps cleanly to a MITRE ATT&CK technique, we note it so your detection team can align monitoring.

For each unmitigated threat we recommend a concrete control, and we tie those controls back into your backlog as security requirements. The deliverable includes the diagrams, the threat register, the risk ranking, and the recommendations, in a form your architects can keep updating as the system evolves.

A new service, a new integration, or a re-platforming is the ideal trigger. Modeling the design before implementation lets you choose the authentication model, the isolation boundaries and the data-handling approach with the threats already in view.

Payment flows, a new tenant-isolation model, an admin console, or anything that touches sensitive data deserves its own focused model. We can run a short session scoped to the feature rather than the whole platform.

A threat model is the best possible brief for a later penetration test. It tells the testers where the designers themselves are nervous, which turns a generic test into a targeted one. Teams that model first get more value from every pentest that follows.

A service trusts input from a network segment, a queue, or a partner integration that an attacker can reach or influence. The classic version is an internal API that assumes every caller is trusted because it sits behind the load balancer, when in fact a compromised front-end service can call it freely. On the diagram this shows up the moment you mark where trust actually changes.

Authentication gets attention; authorization between users of the same role often does not. A model that traces who is allowed to act on which object surfaces the insecure direct object reference before it ships, rather than leaving it for a pentester to find in production.

Repudiation threats are easy to overlook because they cause no immediate outage. If a privileged action leaves no reliable trace, you cannot investigate an incident or prove what happened. We flag the flows where an audit record is a requirement, not a nice-to-have.

A shared secret, a single admin account, a key that both encrypts and signs. These concentrate risk in a way a diagram makes obvious and a feature spec hides. Spreading that risk is usually a design change, which is exactly why it is cheap to make now and expensive to retrofit later.